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I. INTRODUCTION
Since its enactment in 1977, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has
received little serious scrutiny as to its effectiveness.' The significant
portion of commentators on this law are practitioners who sell compliance
services in an active and growing market,2 in whose professional interest
it could be to portray the law as one that is effectively enforced.
Academics have for the most part declined, using statistics combined with
actual case study, to examine how well the law actually works.' The debate
over the appropriateness of the FCPA as well as its effectiveness has often
taken place, as a result, in a fact-free vacuum."
This Article contends that from the standpoint of anyone who would
wish to deter bribery abroad, the FCPA has been greatly under-enforced
since it was enacted. It looks in a theoretical way at how much U.S.
bribery might be expected to occur overseas, versus how much there is in
this country. The author has reviewed every bribery-related FCPA

1. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (1998).
2. See Org. Econ. Cooperation and Dev., US.: Phase 2; Rep. on Application of the
Conventionon CombatingBriberyofForeignPub. OfficialsinInt 'lBus. Transactionsandthe1997
Recommendation on Combating Bribery in Int'l Bus. Transactions 18 (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter
OECD], availableat http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/19/1962084.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits oflnstitutionalDesign:Implementing the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. INT'L 665 (2004); James R. Hines, ForbiddenPaymentforeign
BriberyandAmericanBusiness After 1977 (Nat'l Bureau ofEcon. Research, Working Paper 5266,
1995); Masako N. Darrough, The FCPA and the OECD Convention, Some Lessons From the US.
Experience (2004), http://ssm.com/abstract=555643. Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global
Market: A CriticalAnalysis of the ForeignCorruptPracticesAct, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 229,
231 n.8, 237 (1997) (posing the question as to why so many reputable businesses are still getting
into FCPA trouble, even after noting that in 20 years, not a single chief executive was convicted
of overseas bribery under the FCPA).
4. Thomas W. Dunphy & David Hess, GettingfromSalbu to the 'TippingPoint':The Role
of CorporateAction Within a Portfolio ofAnti-CorruptionStrategies,21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
471, 472 (2001). At the outset of their argument that the FCPA should be among a portfolio of
approaches to combat bribery, the authors dismiss a fact-based approach to the FCPA by asserting
its deterrence effect is "undocumented, if not undocumentable."
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conviction or enforcement action since the law was enacted,5 and provides
some detail on those convictions achieved comparatively cheaply, often
by companies turning themselves in or by acquirers doing due
diligence-as opposed to those which resulted from lengthy or expensive
investigation. This is the sort of analysis a working party from the OECD
concluded was necessary to evaluate the FCPA, but which until now has
not been done.
The conclusion: because the actual or intended flow of money or
"anything of value" from briber to the bribee is a necessary element to
prove a crime of bribery,' increasing the difficulty of tracing money is a
critically important part of any corrupt enterprise's operation if it wishes
to avoid detection. A review of the cases shows that more than half of
those caught bribing could either have avoided detection easily, or made
it much more difficult to prosecute them had only simple steps been taken
to disguise money flows. As a result, without greatly increased funding for

5. A complete catalogue ofthe "easy" or "cheap" cases has been edited for length. Infra Part
III. Only a sampling presented in the text. A full list with abbreviated comments appears in the
Appendix.
6. See, e.g., SEC v. Monsanto Co., [2005] 5 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 699.9167,
1:05CV00014 (D.D.C. Jan. 6,2005).
7. In its evaluation of the FCPA's progress the OECD, see OECD, supranote 2, at 27. The
organization stated:
[Tihere are no clear, documented, formal processes between agencies to underpin
the vital exchange of information and reporting of suspected violations, and a
corresponding absence of statistics. This results in a lack of transparency and of
data, which, if captured, could serve useful analytical purposes in reviewing the
workings of the FCPA.
In its latest report on U.S. compliance released in July 2005, the OECD stated that its
recommendation for a formal statistical analysis of the FCPA's enforcement has not been
implemented, and that "It is difficult to assess how effective the existing mechanisms have been
in uncovering foreign bribery." US. Phase 2, Follow-Up Report on the Implementation of Phase
2 Recommendations on the Application of the Convention and the 1997 Recommendation on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, at 17 (June
1, 2005).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 201.
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investigation, the FCPA is a flawed model on which to base all
expectations of foreign bribery deterrence.'
Implied in this Article but unexamined for purposes of length limitation
are the following assumptions:
1. That bribery of public officials abroad is, for the most part, harmful to
the citizens of the particular country.'0 The literature on corruption
appears to have defeated the notion that bribery is efficient or desirable,
and regime change in certain corrupt countries has helped debunk that
myth as well. " Rather than staying with the bribery-as-efficiency
approach, after the United States stood nearly alone among developed
countries for two decades in its insistence on outlawing foreign bribery,

9. See Darrough, supra note 3 (drawing a similar though more tentative conclusion as to the
FCPA's effectiveness, but concluding that the OECD's convention against bribery will have a
greater chance of success than the FCPA because there will be collective incentives among
developed countries to enforce the convention. This paper, on the other hand, argues that the FCPA
model is flawed, and it is unclear that multilateral application will do anything to improve its
effectiveness because of the high cost of public enforcement).
10. See, e.g., Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption,108 QJ. ECON. 599, 616
(1993) (Bribery payments that convince public officials to invest in marginal projects or to award
contracts on the basis of kickbacks waste assets in developing countries); Cheryl W. Gray & Daniel
Kaufinann, CorruptionandDevelopment,in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON COMBATING CORRUPTION, 21 32 (Transparency International & The World Bank, 1998) [hereinafterNEwPERSPECTIVES] (finding
that where corruption is perceived to be high, managers spend comparatively more time with
government bureaucrats); Daniel Kaufman et al., GovernanceMattersIV. GovernanceIndicators
for 1996-2004 (May 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=718081. See also Larry Rohter & Juan Forero,
Unending Graft is ThreateningLatin America, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at Al.
11. Indonesia, before the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, was often cited as an example
of a corrupt country with nonetheless comparatively positive attributes for business and efficiency.
See Kenneth U. Sujadinata, Revisiting CorruptPracticesFrom a MarketPerspective, 12 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 1021, 1049 (1998) (arguing for the repeal of the FCPA and substitution of a marketbased approach to allow business to choose between bribing and not bribing). Post-Suharto
Indonesia has suffered from capital flight because of higher perceived risk that follows from a
dearth of reliable non-military institutions. Just this year, after the initial wave of generosity over
aiding victims of the Tsunami, the world focused anew on the endemic corruption in Indonesia, and
fears that authorities would steal large portions of aid money earmarked for reconstruction. See
Raymond Bonner, Asia's Deadly Wars: The Money; Corruption in Indonesia is Worrying Aid
Groups,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A8. We should care about corruption from an efficiency
standpoint, and also because corruption is a two-way street: it takes two to bribe. Exhortations by
Western governments against government corruption in Africa or Asia ring hollow if Western
companies are easily able to bribe and are perceived to be doing so. See Gray & Kaufinann,
Corruption and Development, in NEW PERSPECTIVES, supra note 10 (asserting that corruption
correlates negatively with civil liberties and with women's economic and social human rights).
These are not efficiency arguments, but help to bolster the idea that corruption is undesirable.
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the rest of the developed world has come around (in theory) to the U.S.
view.12
2. That bribery is seldom "culturally appropriate."'" Bribery of officials
tends to be illegal the world over, although such rules are often
selectively enforced for political reasons, or enforced hardly at all.
There is an affirmative defense to bribing an official overseas under the
FCPA if that bribe is legal in the country concerned, 4 but this defense
has hardly ever been relied upon in the few published foreign bribery
cases.

3. The "routine governmental action" (or "grease payments") 5 exception

offered by the FCPA cannot explain the dearth of convictions, since the
standard as to what is "routine governmental action," and what is
therefore allowed to be paid for has not been the subject of even a
nominal amount of litigation to try to escape the clutches of the
FCPA-a result we would expect if it proved to be a loophole to foil
robust enforcement.' 6 Instead, several recent defendants approached
their defense from the other side, 7 arguing that all payments to foreign

12. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, December 17, 1997, 37 LL.M. 1.
13. For a review ofthe debate over the "moral imperialism" ofthe FCPA, see Bill Shaw, The
Foreign CorruptPracticesAct and Progeny: Morally Unassailable,33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 689

(2000).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c), 78dd-2(c), 78dd-3(c) (1998).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b) (1998).
16. Much ink is spilled in the literature over the difficulties businesses face in distinguishing
between permitted and prohibited payments, because of cross-cultural difficulties U.S. companies
face in transacting business in alien cultures. See Salbu, supranote 3, at 265-67; Dunphy & Hess,
supra note 4, at 476. In fact, few if any cases turn on distinguishing facilitation payments from
prohibited bribes, because "routine governmental action" is well defined in the statute. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(3)(B), 78dd-2(h)(4XB), 78dd-3(f)(4XB) (1998). In addition, research has
tended to show a correlation between facilitation payments and the proliferation of corruption on
a grand scale, which should lead to more convictions, not fewer. See Antonio Argandona,
Corruption and Companies: The Case of FacilitatingPayments (Univ. Of Navarra (Spain),
Working Paper No. 539, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=685861.
17. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004); SEC v. Mattson, Civ. A. No. H01-3106 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2002). The issue of law in both these cases was whether a bribe to
induce officials to lower a tax bill was prohibited by the FCPA, or whether such a bribe was outside
the scope of prohibitions on payments to "assist... in obtaining or retaining business." Kay's case
was dismissed, but the government won on appeal, the case was remanded and Kay plus codefendant Douglas Murphy were convicted at trial. Murphy testified at trial that he had no
knowledge of any payments made to Haitian government officials, but during the trial changed his
defense once the government proved the existence of the payments, and argued unsuccessfully that
they were facilitation payments only. Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Kay, No.
4:01crO0914, at 18 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12,2001). Mattson and Harris, the defendants in the SEC civil
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officials are permitted if they are not for the express purpose of
obtaining or retaining business.
4. That the level of optimal enforcement of the FCPA is greater than what
exists at present. The realistic goal cannot be to eradicate foreign bribegiving, any more than legislatures that prohibit murder believe they
will completely do away with homicide. '
5. That bribery is a two-sided transaction. Without a supply-side of
funding in the form of corporations willing to bribe, the pipeline of
bribe money flowing from developed company to developing
government official bank account and-quite often--back to a
developed country bank, would empty in no time. Western
governments and shareholders have more leverage over bribe-givers in
Africa or Asia than on bribe-takers, 9 it, therefore, makes sense to
attack the supply side vigorously.
Section II of this Article first estimates how many FCPA convictions
might be given the same enforcement rate as we observe in U.S. domestic
bribery cases.20 Section II then constructs an admittedly rough index of
convictions per dollar of investment, both in the United States and abroad.
The section then estimates enforcement quality in a different way, by
approaching the history of convictions by the country in which the bribe
is received. If countries that receive a great share of U.S. foreign
investment see few or even no convictions under the FCPA over twentyfive years, even while registering heavy perceived corruption both at home
and among foreign investors, it is at least reasonable to assume that the law
is under-enforced. Both the convictions per dollar calculation and the
action, had their case dismissed on similar grounds to Kay's, but the Fifth Circuit dismissed the
government's appeal. See SEC Litigation Release No. 18863 (Sept. 1, 2004).
18. The assumption is that to deter bribe-giving is a worthwhile goal on its face, but since
2001 has taken on greater importance: the vast literature on "failed states" inevitably contains
descriptions of disillusioned populations, fed up with corrupt authorities which have been robbing
the treasury for decades. Such is the atmosphere that can turn people to revolution, to religious
fanaticism, or to both. See, e.g., Elizabeth Becker, Report Says Aid to Weak States is Inadequate,
N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 9,2004, at A3; Joseph R. Biden, A DemocraticForeignPolicy, WALLST. J., Sept.
9, 2004, at A16.
19. Domestically-based bribe-givers maybe regulated by legislation or punished criminally.
Foreign parties may not.
20. The offenses for bribing U.S. and foreign government officials are now treated identically
for purposes of sentencing. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELiNES MANUAL, App. C, Amend. 639 (2004)
(raising the guideline sentence for an FCPA violation from Base Level 8 to Base Level 14).
Previously the FCPA guidelines were akin to those for domestic commercial bribery of private
officials, they are now parallel to offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994), which covers the bribery
of public officials in the United States.
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convictions by country or recipient estimates indicate underenforcement
of the FCPA.2'
Section Ilm attempts to explain the apparent under-enforcement of the
FCPA by looking at the cost of enforcement. Investigation leading to
enforcement is expensive, while the convictions under the FCPA have so
far been disproportionately cheap. Convictions have tended either to fall
into the laps of authorities, having been initiated by the companies
themselves or, less often, by overseas law enforcement officials.
Convictions have resulted from investigations by government agencies
who happen upon the corruption while investigating something else.
Finally and probably most importantly, a significant number of an alreadylow number of convictions have been as a result of careless banking and
recordkeeping practices. A safe-cracker who forgets to wear gloves and
then leaves fingerprints can still be caught, but we would credit the arrest
more to the bungling of the thief than skilled detective work. This Article
reasons that even a modest amount of care on the part of the bribe-givers
would have made it much more difficult to secure convictions in these
cases. To the extent that most bribe-givers are less than clumsy in the
recordkeeping, bribes are probably going undetected. This Article is not
estimating based on a representative sampling of FCPA bribery cases, but
of all of these cases the author has been able to detect using the Foreign
Corrupt Practices ACT Reporter,22 the Department ofJustice and SEC web
sites, as well as PACER.
Section IV argues that the FCPA, as it is currently enforced, should not
be adopted as a model for anti-bribery laws in other countries, in the sense
that the United States relies too heavily on the FCPA's effectiveness. A
more pragmatic if imperfect approach is to realize that the law is more
expensive to enforce than we have wished to admit. Establishing a private
right of action would solve little, since the government must often
establish beneficial ownership of offshore accounts and trusts, in order to
trace funds that are the lifeblood of corrupt transactions.23
As effective as criminal sanctions against bribery would be, even given
adequate funding to enforce them, a public shaming regime comparable to
the one used by interest and shareholder groups which monitor company
use of overseas child or prison labor might prove as useful. The same may

21. See Discussion accompanying notes 48-52; infra Part II.B.
22. Business Laws, Inc., FCPA Rep. (Jan. 2005) [hereinafter FCPA Rep.].
23. See Stacey K. Lee, PiercingOffshoreAsset ProtectionTrusts in the CaymanIslands:The
Creditor's View, 11 TRANSNAT'L LAw 463, 494 (1998).
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be said for inexpensive compliance codes which investors could monitor.24
In addition, the trend abroad to privatize industry calls for a new approach,
because the FCPA covers only payments to officials of governmentcontrolled entities.25 To the extent that there is good will among some
foreign governments to investigate bribe-taking by their own officials,
those good intentions may not be easily converted into effective anticorruption work as privatization proceeds. On top of this problem,
investigating the private sector can entail an entirely new level of
complexity compared to an internal governmental investigation.
Whatever the way forward, the most dangerous approach is the one
which currently prevails: to pretend that the FCPA is effective. Indeed, this
approach stifles debate about how to improve and supplement the law to
increase deterrence of bribe-giving.
II. ESTIMATING ENFORCEMENT EFFICIENCY

How many FCPA convictions should we expect to see? The standard
argument that the FCPA is effective tends to cite a number of recent
convictions, without putting these into any statistical context.26 Some such
as Nichols, rely on assertions of American business executives who claim

24. These are not solutions unto themselves, but should work in combination with enhanced
regulatory oversight. For a thoughtful look at the limits of corporate social responsibility, see
Thomas F. Mcnemey, 6 Issues in the Development of an Anti-CorruptionManagement System
Standard,http://www.idli.org/DLRC/documents/Anticorruption.pdf.
25. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I to 78dd-3 (1998).
26. Former Judge Stanley Sporkin, credited with originating the FCPA when he was Director
of the Enforcement Division at the SEC, is a typical taker of this approach, as were other speakers
at a conference in 1998 at Northwestern University, held to assess the effects of the FCPA 20 years
after its enactment. The Worldwide Banning of Shmiergold: A Look at the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 269 (1998). Buchheit and
Reisner told the same conference: "The FCPA has been remarkably effective in altering corporate
behavior. Many large multinational corporations have instituted 'compliance programs' designed
to deter and uncover activities that could, at the least, embarrass the company and, at the worst,
subject it to civil or criminal penalties." See id.; Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, Why has the
FCPA Prospered?, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 263 (1998). See also a lengthy article by two
attorneys surveying the history ofthe FCPA's enforcement, which concluded: "The severe penalties
of the FCPA have served as ample motivation for U.S. companies to take measures to ensure that
they adhere to the law. Increased enforcement and escalation of penalties in the 1990s-best
exemplified by the $59 million paid by General Electric pursuant to a plea bargain-greatly
increase the importance of compliance with anti-bribery law." Christopher F. Corr & Judd Lawler,
DamnedIf You Do, DamnedIf You Don 't? The OECD Conventionandthe GlobalizationofAntiBribery Measures, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1249, 1324 (1999).
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they do not bribe27 to support the view that the FCPA has had an adequate
deterrent effect.
Pointing to two or three indictments in a recent year is like using three
speeding tickets issued on an interstate highway to make a case that
speeding is under control. Without an overall traffic rate, one cannot know
whether three speeding tickets are too few or too many. The great
dependence of U.S. authorities on whistleblowers and companies turning
themselves in-for instance, after bribery has been discovered during due
diligence prior to an acquisition 2 -is also cause for worry. Indeed,
Highway Patrol counts on catching offenders who wish not to be caught,
by investing in adequate numbers of police cruisers, radios, and other
necessary equipment.29 Without these expenditures, enforcement would
suffer. Some would-be speeders would slow down because that was the
law, but most would not, as they would think they would likely not get
caught.
A low number of arrests and convictions of Americans who bribe
foreign government officials can mean either that the FCPA is effective in
deterring undesirable behavior, or that corrupt U.S. companies, and
individuals, are successfully avoiding prosecution. Even though the United
States, for more than two decades, has been one of the few countries to ban
bribery of foreign officials," the international business community, as
measured by Berlin-based Transparency International,3 perceives that
U.S. companies doing foreign business are no less likely to offer bribes
than many of their European counterparts, who until recently were not
restricted from offering bribes.32
Transparency made its name with an index which measures perceived
likelihood by countries to accept bribes, but in 1999 began to issue a Bribe

27. Philip M. Nichols, Regulating TransnationalBribery in Times of Globalizationand
Fragmentation24 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 286 (1999).
28. See infratext accompanying note 61; infra text accompanying note 56; see also United
States v. ABB Vetco Gray, Inc., [2005] 5 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 699.9054, Criminal No. H-04CR-279 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2004); United States v. Syncor Taiwan, Inc., [20031 5 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws) 699.8626, (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2002). All stemming from discoveries during due diligence,
these account for a third of the foreign bribery-related cases resulting in conviction or settlement

from 2002 to early 2005.
29. See, e.g., California's Proposed Budget for 2006-2007 adding 10 positions and $491
million for more sophisticated radios, http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/BudgetSummary/BTH8860454.

html.
30. Salbu, supranote 3, at 231.
31. See infraAppendix 1; Transparency International Web Site, http://www.transparency.org
[hereinafter Transparency Int'l].
32. See, e.g., infra note 36.
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Payers Index (BPI).3 3 The traditional index was criticized by many as an
incomplete picture of corruption.3' Just as the U.S. law against bribery of
domestic public officials prohibits both giving and taking bribes,35
Transparency International began with its new index to chart admittedly
unscientific perceptions of the propensity to pay bribes-and not simply
to receive them. As has been the case in the studies since, not only did
U.S. businesses rank as more likely to pay bribes than several western
countries including Sweden, Australia, and Canada, but they even
achieved a similar ranking to Germany, where until 1999, bribes of
overseas officials were not only legal, but tax-deductible.36
There have been attempts to demonstrate the FCPA's effectiveness by
showing a fall in foreign investment by U.S. companies in countries
thought to be comparatively corrupt. The principle study, by Hines,
claimed to have refuted earlier findings that the FCPA has had little
deterrent effect on company conduct.37
A. Comparison to Domestic Bribery
Usually, the only statistical method used to attempt to measure
international corruption is perception.38 Transparency International itself
routinely cautions that this is highly imprecise, given the unscientific
method of polling and the measurement of perceptions.39 However, there
are other ways we should be able to approximate the relative propensity
33. See infra Table 1; Transparency Int'l, supra note 31.
34. See, e.g., Transparency International Annual Report, at 12, (1999), at http://
transparency.org/publications/annua.report.
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
36. "On the basis of (Germany's] new 1999/2000/2002 Tax Act (Steuergesetz) bribes may
no longer be tax deducted in future." Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development,
Germany - Phase 1: Report on Implementation ofthe OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, at 14 (Jun.
27, 2000). The BPI for 2002 contained rankings similar to that for 1999. Supra note 31.
37. James R. Hines, Jr., ForbiddenPayments:ForeignBriberyandAmericanBusinessAfter
1977 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5266, 1995). The paper is by now out
of date, and at the time of publication contained insufficient data. In aggregating target countries
with high economic growth into two groups, according to whether they are "corrupt" or "less
corrupt," Hines used just nine countries for each grouping, without proof that they are
representative. There is no explanation as to why, on a scale of I to 10, ratings of 0-7 should be
"corrupt" and 8-10 "less corrupt." The paper also excludes data after 1982, after which the boom
in Southern China, rife with corruption, elicited torrents of new investment.
38. Transparency International, the leading benchmarker of corruption calls its index the
"Corruption Perceptions Index." See TI Corruption Perceptions Index Methodology (2005), http://
transparency.org/policyresearch/surveys indices/cpi/2005/methodology.
39. See 2005 Frequently Asked Questions TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI 2005), at
http://transparency.org/policyresearch/surveys indices/cpi/2005/faqcpi2005.
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of U.S. companies to bribe and the likelihood that bribe-payers will get
caught. Since the prohibition against bribing public officials in the United
States is substantially the same as the FCPA's prohibition against bribing
public officials outside the United States,' it should be instructive to
compare conviction volumes.
This comparison is imperfect in two major ways: First, it is biased in
favor of comparatively high FCPA enforcement rates in that 18 U.S.C. §
201 is not the only public statute against bribing public officials in the U.S.
Bribery of public officials is illegal in all 50 states, and prohibitions on
bribery of state officials can be found in both state constitutions and
statutes.' For the sake of length, this Article does not count state-level
bribery convictions in the United States.
Another bias that makes FCPA enforcement look more robust against
domestic bribery than it actually is, is the fact that this Article includes
among "convictions" consent decrees in which companies neither admit
nor deny allegations of foreign bribery. In some cases, companies paid
fines which were relatively small compared to the benefits flowing
therefrom. 2 It also includes as a "conviction" any civil liability under the
FCPA. The federal statistics for bribery convictions do not include decrees
lacking an admission or guilt or civil liability.43
A bias which cuts in the opposite way is that the FCPA covers only the
giving of bribes, whereas the domestic bribery statute covers both the
giving and taking of bribes.' While there remains plenty of work to be
done to quantify these differences and reconcile the similarity between the
language of the two statutes, the statistical disparity between federal
domestic and FCPA convictions is still stark and merits examination.
Another difference is worth noting: The domestic bribery statute targets
the bribery of both public officials and witnesses,4 which casts a broader
net than the FCPA. Its language on the bribe offered to a public official
encompasses "intent to influence any official act," while the FCPA is
aimed only at payments made with an intention of "obtaining or retaining

40. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 78m, 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (1998).
41. Thomas F.McInemey, The Regulation of Bribery in the United States, 73 INT'L REV.
PENAL L. 100 (2002).
42. See Darrough, supranote 3, at 16. Working with incomplete figures which are "at best,
suggestive," a limited universe ofFCPA convictions yielded a median fine of $75,000 on a median
value of $10 million of business at stake.
43. See infra note 49.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 201(bX3) (1994).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 201(bXlXA) (1994).
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business. ' In practice, U.S. courts have held that payoffs to reduce a tax
bill can count as bribes which assist in the retention of business,48 and
while there may be inefficient companies which bribe because it makes
them feel good, it is safe to say that most who pay off public officials do
so because it is good for business.
The average number of offenders convicted of bribery in the U.S.
District Courts (where bribery is the most serious offense charged) from
fiscal years 1995-2000 was 199.3 per year.49 Taking an average number for
1995 to 2000 of $1.4 trillion per year in gross private domestic
investment, ° the result is 0.14 convictions per billion dollars of
investment. Put another way, there was one federal bribery conviction for
every $7 billion of private investment.
Consider a similar approach to convictions or consent decrees for
violating the foreign bribery provisions of the FCPA. There were 63
convictions or consent decrees between and including 1977 and July of
2005, or about two per year.5 Foreign direct investment by U.S.
companies between 1995 and 2000 totaled $755 billion, or an average of
$125.9 billion per year.52 The numbers work out to fewer than 0.02 foreign
bribery convictions per billion dollars of foreign direct investment. That
is, a conviction for every $63 billion in investment. For every dollar of
investment, there are nine times more bribery convictions for bribes to
U.S. officials than for bribes to foreign officials. After cutting in half the
number of domestic bribery convictions (to cover bribe giving but not
bribe taking), the disparity is still more than four times the rate seen in the
United States. These statistics alone ought to create at least a suspicion that
the FCPA is under-enforced. And this suspicion should have increased as

47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b) (1998).
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3)(B)& 78dd-2(a)(3)(B) (1998), cited in United States v. Kay.
49. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS

(2003).
50. See generally In Constant-Year 2000 Trillions of Dollars: U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Gross Domestic Product Statistics.
51. When there were both civil and criminal proceedings related to the same set of facts, I
have counted the incident as a single case. The vast majority of some 800 convictions, consent
decrees or enforcement actions under the FCPA since its inception have nothing to do with overseas
bribery. The FCPA is technically an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a (1998). It contains provisions that mandate adequate maintenance of books and records. Prior
to the FCPA, the government prosecuted extraterritorial graft relying as it does today on the
prohibition against conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994), on laws against fraud 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(1996), and wire fraud 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2002).
52. See U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD: CouNTRY AND INDUSTRY DETAIL FOR CAPrrAL
OuT. ows (2000), availableat www.bea.doc.gov/bea/di/usdiacap.htm#2000.
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of 1998, when Congress amended the FCPA to abolish any U.S. territorial
nexus under the Act's alternative jurisdiction provisions for U.S.
individuals.53 Previously, conviction required the use of some
instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of the corrupt
practice.'
The OECD highlighted one factor which could help account for the
disparity between domestic and foreign bribery convictions: the fact that
corporate compliance policies at U.S. corporations
are more extensively and intensively taught, understood and
implemented within the U.S. than internationally, where the
problem of bribery is most likely to arise . . . A survey by

Transparency International of leading practices in corporate
governance revealed that companies generally performed less, not
more, monitoring activity in their overseas operations than at home.
It also found that only 52 per cent of respondents who had codes of
conduct had multilingual versions available, and that only 19 per
cent rated their code of conduct as extremely effective.55
Consider Monsanto, which settled with the SEC and the Justice
Department earlier this year, paid civil and criminal penalties of $1.5
million and entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ.56
Despite having an FCPA compliance program, the company conducted no
internal audits of its Indonesian affiliates from 1996 to 2001 5 even though
Indonesia is the site of more bribery violating the FCPA than any other
country but one. 58 In the end, Monsanto uncovered its own bribery and
informed the government of the wrongdoing.59 But how much comfort
should we take, given lax auditing by a sophisticated company which turns
itself in, as to the conduct of another similarly-sized company which has
not come forward to confess bribery?'

53. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(i) (1998).
54. Pub. L. 105-366, § 3(dXl) (adding the alternative jurisdiction provisions to the FCPA).
55. See OECD, supra note 2, at 18.
56. SEC v. Monsanto Co., [2005] 5 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 699.9167, 1:05CV00014
(D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2005); SEC Litigation Release No. 19023 (Jan. 6, 2005).
57. In the Matter of Monsanto Co., SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11789, Jan.
6, 2005.
58. Infra Table 1.
59. See supra text accompanying note 56.
60. The Monsanto enforcement, rather than being an aberration, is closer to the norm in
FCPA enforcement history. See infraPart III.
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While it is possible that businesses operating outside the United States
bribe less than businesses and individuals do inside the country,
examination of the kinds of convictions obtained under the FCPA leads to
a starkly different conclusion: that most of the convictions and consent
decrees obtained by the government were either handed to the authorities
by the company concerned, or the criminal conduct of those found guilty
was so clumsy that even the most rudimentary precautions would have
helped greatly to avoid detection. Many of these cases are dealt with in
detail in Section 111.
B. GeographicBreakdown of Convictions
A rash of bribery convictions in countries that take relatively small
shares of U.S. direct investment might indicate under-enforcement,
especially if independent indices suggest that countries with low
conviction rates have independently high rates of bribe taking or bribe
solicitation.
Table 1 lists the countries to which foreign bribes have been directed
(or alleged to have been directed) in the sixty-three convictions or consent
decrees recorded by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Reporter, the DOJ,
the SEC, and the Judiciary's PACER service covering the federal courts.
Column three represents that country's share of total convictions or
consent decrees under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA since
enactment, and column four that country's share of total U.S. foreign
direct investment for the year 2000.
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Table 1
Country

Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Azerbaijan
Benin

Brazil
Canada
Chile
China

Colombia
Cook Is.
Costa Rica
Dominican
Republic
Egypt
Gabon
Germany
(West)
Greece
Haiti
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel

# of Cases
(One Per
Country
Unless Noted),
Comments
Partial case
Partial case
3

% of FCPA
Convictions/Decrees

<1.6
<1.6
4.8
1.6
<1.6

Partial case
with Nepal,
Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka,
France, and
Japan
2
2
Partial case
Partial case
with
Philippines,
Thailand

3

0.47
n/a

3.2
3.2
<1.6
<1.6

2.3
11.8
n/a
Combined

1.6
1.6
1.6
4.8

0.2
<0.04
0.3
0.1

6.3
1.6
1.6

0.4 (in 2001)
<0.2
2.7

1.6
3.2
11.1
<1.6
1.6
1.6

0.07
<0.7
0.5
n/a
<0.3
0.3

4

2
7
Partial case

% of Total
U.S. FDI,
2000 ($142.6
Billion)
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Ivory
Coast
Jamaica
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Mexico

Partial case

By way of
Sweden
8 cases (7 of
which related
to one series of
bribes to
Pemex
officials)
2
3
2

Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
2
Panama
Poland
Qatar
Russia
3
Saudi
Arabia
1
Taiwan
Trinidad & 2
Tobago
U.K.
Venezuela
1
Country
unspecified I

[Vol. 18

<1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6

<0.7
n/a
<0.23

12.7

2.9

3.2
4.8
3.2
1.6
3.2
1.6
1.6
1.6
4.8

0.08
<0.23
0.1
0.3
0.9
0.4
<0.3
0.2 (in 1999)
0.3

1.6
3.2

0.7
<0.7

1.6
1.6
1.6
I

I

Several countries represent a negligible share of U.S. business interest
abroad. Yet, those countries account for a disproportionate share in the
number of bribes detected since 1977. That could be as a result of two
factors: they could be more corrupt than countries in which we observe
fewer or zero convictions, and/or local law enforcement cooperation could
be better than it is in China, for example, which is a major destination of
U.S. capital but which has this year yielded only its first conviction or
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consent decree under the FCPA'--discovered by an acquiring company
during "due diligence" and not by the U.S. authorities. 2
In some cases, the amount of business done in a country may not
correlate well with investment. For instance, Egypt is a major recipient of
defense assistance from the United States, while private U.S. businesses
invest relatively little in that country. Still, there are major recipients of
U.S. investment which are not on the radar screen when attempting to
detect bribery. Taken together, China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea,
India, Italy, and Venezuela had a collective 16.6% of FDI in 2000, but up
to that point none of those countries had ever been the location of a single
bribe that resulted in either an FCPA conviction or a consent decree. 63
Because of the high number of prosecutions from a single case (seven
from the bribery of Mexican state oil company Pemex), Mexico appears
to have yielded more than its expected share of bribery violations. Yet,
since most of those violations were from a single bribery scheme, the
possibility that many other incidents of bribery go undetected or
unprosecuted remains highly plausible.
The idea that only two U.S. companies have ever paid bribes in China,
Korea, or Venezuela since the FCPA's enactment seems farfetched. All of
these countries score as having plenty of officials happy to accept bribes,
according to Transparency International." While the Transparency
International index may be imprecise, the most serious criticism which
tends to be directed against it is that it omits to rate certain countries.
Ratings of individual countries are taken from a variety of sources which
tend to poll experienced business executives. 5
To assume that not having any bribery convictions in the preceding list
of major trading partners is reasonable, an analyst would have to presume
that the FCPA is acting as a deterrent to bribery. To be an effective
deterrent, the FCPA would have to overcome what is probably a greater
temptation for companies to offer bribes abroad than at home: more
61. SEC v. GE InVision, Inc., C-05-0660MEJ (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14,2005).
62. [2005] 1 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 106.006.
63. From survey of every code reported in FCPA Report since FCPA's inception.
64. In 2000, in a ranking of 90 countries, with more corrupt countries ranking lower,
Venezuela, China, South Korea ranked 71st, 63rd, and 48th, respectively. Some jurisdictions
involved with multiple FCPA convictions ranked as less prone to corruption, including Taiwan
(28th). Egypt ranked on par with China in corruption, and has registered three FCPA convictions
to China's one despite China's much greater importance as a destination for U.S. investment.
Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index (2000), available at www.transparency.
org/policyresearch/surveys indices/cpi/previous cpi
65. Supra note 38.
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solicitation of bribes than the companies might be used to in the United
States, as well as highly inadequate enforcement of domestic corruption
laws in some very large or profitable markets.
If the FCPA is not used as often as its drafters might have intended,
there are explanations other than the principle one embraced later in this
Article, (that the law is too costly to enforce with current funding levels
and international banking practices, especially without cooperation of
foreign legal authorities). Harvey Pitt, who later became Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) but who helped to draft the
FCPA when he was a lawyer at the commission in the 1970s, asserts that
at various times there has been a reluctance to enforce the FCPA, since
U.S. companies were perceived to be at a disadvantage relative to
companies from countries with no prohibition on foreign bribery." If that
is so, and if U.S. businesses could pick up on that reluctance, the U.S.
Commerce Department was not misleading when it used to offer an annual
tally of the billions of dollars in business U.S. companies had allegedly
lost overseas because they were restricted from offering bribes, while
European and Asian competitors were not.67 No methodology or list of
unsuccessful bids has ever been offered by Commerce to support its
assertions of lost business.
1I. THE EASY (CHEAP)/HARD (EXPENSIVE) DIVIDE
A. The Methodology

This Article takes the position that the FCPA makes it relatively
inexpensive for companiesto bribe abroad. Disguising bribery is cheap.
The chances of being detected are low. The author has examined the sixtythree companies or individuals involved in successful FCPA prosecutions
or decrees since the law's enactment. 68 From failing to take inexpensive
steps to disguise the beneficial owners of bank accounts, to the clumsy

66. Interview with Harvey Pitt, Former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman (Apr.
14,2004).
67. Eleanor Roberts Lewis, Chief Counsel for International Commerce, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Speech to American Bar Association Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and
the OECD Convention (Mar. 21, 2002), (transcript available at http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/
occic/abaspeech.htm).
68. In classifying the easy and hard cases, I have identified as "hard" any case lacking details
as to how the bribe was detected. In addition, I have credited as a conviction any consent decree
with no admission of guilt.
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involvement of U.S. diplomats in the proposed. bribery of overseas
officials, U.S. companies have often displayed a surprising ineptitude in
their ability to fly beneath the under-funded radar at the Department of
Justice and the SEC. For the sixty-three convictions under the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA or consent decrees since 1977, 1 have classified 36
as "easy" or "cheap" for the U.S. authorities to handle. This may be due
to poor planning on the part of U.S. companies, or because the
investigations were undertaken by other agencies and yielded evidence of
bribery by accident. Most commonly, companies turned themselves into
the authorities.
If the FCPA seems under-enforced with just a bit more than two cases
a year in a quarter century, not to mention the statistical and countryspecific analysis in Section II, it looks much weaker considering the
number of cases that should have been uncommonly easy to prove. With
so many mistakes being made by companies, and with an inexpensive
alternative course of action that would make detection much harder, the
government bears the burden to prove that the FCPA properly deters.
In the easy cases, the prosecution overcomes three major sorts of
barriers.
1. Costly Financial Detection
The most difficult element in proving a case is the tracing of funds
through offshore corporations and bank accounts, the beneficial ownership
of which can be extremely costly to determine. Suppose that in order to
prove a case against a bribe-giver who is determined not to get caught, the
United States must prove that payments to a particular Caribbean
corporation secretly benefited the procurement minister in the foreign
country concerned. Proving the link between the minister and the company
can be extremely expensive. 9 Buying a pre-established British Virgin

69. One of the attractions of foreign-based trusts is that not only are these hostile to the
interests of nonresident creditors, but
the creditor may encounter difficulty in discovering vital documents which would
trace how the [trust] was funded, who the key players are, and where the trust
assets are located. Cayman Islands confidentiality laws, which apply to all persons
associated with the establishment and administration of [a trust] were drafted
specifically to protect, and thereby attract, foreign settlors and investors.
Stacey K. Lee, PiercingOffshoreAsset Protection Trusts in the Cayman Islands: The Creditors'
View, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. 463,494 (1998).
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Islands company off the shelf can be done in the space of a few days.7"
Still, in many cases, the companies caught violating the FCPA did not
bother to avail themselves of this cheap method of cloaking assets. The
threat that companies can cheaply hide assets and, in so doing, raise the
cost of enforcement for those tracing the assets has only increased in
recent years.7'
2. Foreign Noncooperation
The cooperation of the authorities in foreign countries can also be
critical. Suppose the police forces in South Korea, China, or Venezuela fail
to cooperate in investigating the bribery of officials in their countries, the
United States must then prove the case at home, without power of
subpoena or search in the country where the bribe might have taken
place.72
While following the general current of official opinion in declaring the
FCPA a successful piece of legislation in its high deterrent value, former
Justice Department antifraud prosecutor William F. Pendergast made the
following assertion in a 1995 conference address, about the needs of the
U.S. authorities in tracking down bribery of foreign officials: "In every
prosecution, it is clear the government had obtained adequate evidence of
the foreign bribery activity. The foreign bank records and witness
testimony to key meetings are the linchpin evidence. Without the ability
to trace monies to the foreign official, these prosecutions probably would
not have gone forward."73
3. Lack of a Quid Pro Quo
Several of the successful convictions for violations of the FCPA
featured neat written statements of intended bribes, records of a series of
bribes, or other documents making the government's case easier than it
would have been had simple rules been followed not to record such illegal
arrangements. A quid pro quo for a payment helps establish an accused's
culpability according to the statute's definition of knowledge of a corrupt

70. See, e.g., Offshore Corporation Web Site, www.offshorecorporation.com; Offshore
Companies House, British Virgin Islands, IBC's Have the Following Features and Advantages,
www.bvi-corporations-ibc-incorporateinbvi.offshre-companies.co.uk"
71. See OECD, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that "the pattern has changed from the classic
suitcase filled with cash to more subtle scenarios involving intermediaries, complex transactions
with government entities, and misstatements of business or promotional expenses.").
72. Id. at 28.
73. See [1996] 1 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 102.014.
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payment.74 Even the most rudimentary measures to conceal bribes would
counsel against a written agreement to bribe.
B. The Comparatively Easy Cases

Following is a sampling of some of the thirty-six cases I have classified
as "easy" or "cheap" for authorities to have made. They make up roughly
half of all successful prosecutions of foreign bribery since the FCPA was
enacted: they are not only highly representative but also troubling, in that
the bribers were greatly inefficient.
Comparatively complex routing of financial transactions will not
always be undetectable. But by making transactions more difficult to trace,
enforcement costs for the U.S. government rise and the rate of
enforcement should slow, assuming a constant budget and staffing for antibribery investigations. Rational companies seeking to bribe can pay little
and, in exchange, acquire anonymity in their offshore transactions.
1. UnitedStates v. Roy Carver"

An oil company sought business in Qatar. Co-defendant Holley
arranged to involve state department officials, including the U.S.
ambassador to Qatar, in his business negotiations. At a meeting in Qatar
in March, 1978, defendant Carver told the U.S. ambassador that he had
already paid $1.5 million to a Qatari official to obtain his original oil
concession, and "expressed frustration that his entire investment would
soon be lost. Defendant Carver then stated to Ambassador Killgore 'Who
do I go see now, how do I get it done'.7" In the context of Carver's
revelations concerning [official] Al Jaidah, the clear import of Carver's
question was, and [the Ambassador] reasonably construed it to be, an
inquiry as to which officials of the Government of Qatar would be willing
to sell their influence to renew Holcar's concession.""
2. SEC v. Sam P. Wallace78

Consent decree following the allegation of a bribe of $1.3 million paid
to the chairman of the Trinidad & Tobago Racing Authority to obtain a

74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(2)(A), 78dd-2(hX3XA), 78dd-3(f)(3)(A) (1998).
75. [1982] 2 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 645 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 1979).
76. Id. at 645.
77. Id. at 646.
78. [1982] 2 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 682 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 1981). See also United States v.
Alfonso A. Rodriguez, [1984] 2 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 690.06 (D.P.R. Mar. 11, 1983).
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contract to build a grandstand. To the credit of the authorities in the United
States, this case involved penetrating the records of a Cayman Islands
trust. Still, I have classified it as an "easy" case because the defendants
made detection simple for prosecutors in a number of ways. Checks drawn
on the company in favor of an intermediary, and from the intermediary to
the bribe-receiving official, tended to match, making the paper trail for
establishing a bribe very simple. The other avoidable measure was to use
an offshore company controlled by the president of the Wallace subsidiary
in Puerto Rico as an intermediary. Three of the checks to the official in
Trinidad were personally endorsed by the president of that subsidiary.
3. UnitedStates v. Napco International,Inc. & Venturian Corp.79

Agency agreement through which bribes were funneled to officials of
the government of Niger. The agreement used a code name for the agent,
which was part of the given name of a Niger official's live-in girlfriend.
A bank account was opened in the United States, rather than in Niger, in
the name of the agent." In addition, the agency agreement stipulated that
the agent would receive "10% of gross."8' Finally, the corrupt payments
were structured and made within the United States, making enforcement
costs a lot lower than they might have been had more difficult-to-track
aliases been used offshore.
4. UnitedStates v. Morton82
This was a conspiracy to bribe a provincial government controlled
corporation in Canada to induce it to buy passenger buses.8 3 Tracing the
transaction was easy because the payments were made through the
Canadian agent's personal corporation in Canada. Canada does not offer
the anonymity available in other offshore locations.8 The agent also made
large withdrawals from-and deposits of cash to-his own Canadian bank
accounts.85 There is no record of how the bribery scheme was uncovered,

79. [1989] 3 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 697.74, Cr. No. 48965 (D. Minn. Mar. 10, 1989).

80. An account opened outside the country of business is very often the sign of secretive
money flows. See infra Part IV (discussing of shaming and private-sector monitoring approaches
to deterring corruption).
81. Supra text accompanying note 79.
82. [1990] 3 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 698.62, Criminal No. 3-90-061-H (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14,

1990).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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but varied and voluminous cash transactions are an excellent way to attract
the attention of bank auditors during routine checks.8 6
87

5. United States v. F. G. Mason Engineering,Inc.

The zealous government official in what was then West Germany wrote
to the U.S. company (over a discrepancy of 0.03% of the contract price):
"I would like to point out that it was agreed upon between your father and
me that my 'commission' for everything that is associated with the
MICRO-G project will be 13 1/3 percent (not 13.3 percent)..., 8 s This
communication was then mailed to the United States, violating two
cardinal rules of bribery: putting in writing anything that would make a
commission arrangement sound like anything other than a commission
arrangement; and should this rule be disregarded, the writing should never
be sent over U.S. mails or wires.89
6. United States v. Vitusa Corp."
Vitusa sold milk powder to the Dominican Republic, but because it was
not fully paid, it bribed an official to expedite payment.9' It sent, by
facsimile, a letter to a bank in Santo Domingo, instructing that part of its
payment be withheld and given to its agent. 92
Vitusa made enforcement easy by asking the advice of an Agricultural
Service Counselor at the U.S. embassy in Santo Domingo, in which Vitusa
related that a bribe had been solicited. 93 The U.S. official advised Vitusa
not to pay, and then sent a written summary of the conversation to
Vitusa. 9 When bribers alert the authorities that they have been asked for
a bribe, they may not always get caught, but enforcement costs likely
decline immediately as authorities know where to focus their attention.

86. See, e.g., Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Paris Report on Money
Laundering Typologies, 2003-2004, at 12; Financial Action Task Force Web Site, www.fatfgafi.org.
87. [1991] 3 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 698.70, Case No. B-90-29-JAC (D. Conn. June 25,
1990).
88. Id.
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, dd-3 (outlawing use of the mail in overseas bribery. More
prosaically, paper trails make detection easier.).
90. [1994] 3 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 699.155, Criminal No. 93-253 (D.N.J. Apr. 13, 1994).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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7. United States v. DavidH. Mead"5
Mead was an executive at Saybolt, Inc., a company based in
Massachusetts. He was convicted after a jury found he had paid $50,000
to bribe a Panamanian official.96 Saybolt agreed to pay a fine of $4.9
million.97 The criminal investigation of Saybolt was initiated by the
Environmental Protection Agency in Massachusetts, following allegations
concerning data falsification in one of Saybolt's labs."' In the course of
this investigation, agents of the EPA's Criminal Investigations Division
uncovered information concerning the payoff made in Panama.99 A
substantial amount of incriminating evidence against Saybolt and its
officials consisted of e-mails discussing the illegal payment."°
8. United States v. ControlSystems Specialist,Inc.'0 t
Also charged was Darrol R. Crites, the president of the company,
which dealt in surplus military equipment. 2 Both Crites and the company
entered guilty pleas, after they were charged with bribing a Brazilian
military procurement officer who was stationed at a U.S. base in Ohio. a
While laudable that the bribery scheme was uncovered, this was unusual
in that the foreign official was resident in the United States, making this
case little different in complexity from any domestic bribery charge. In
fact, one count of each indictment included a domestic bribery charge
involving a civilian employee of the U.S. Air Force.'0 4 Payments to the
Brazilian officer were easy to trace as they were by company check. 5
None of the extra costs involved in an overseas investigation were
encountered here.' 6

95. [1998] 4 FCPA Rep. 699.534, Cr. Complaint No. 98-3025 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 1998).

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

100. [2002] 1 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 113.023.
101. [ 1999] 4 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 699.587, Case No. CR-3-98-073 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 19,

1998).
102. Id.
103. Id.

104. Id.
105. See contra Lee, supra note 23 (showing complexities involved when sophisticated
concealment mechanisms are used).
106. Id.
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9. SEC v. InternationalBusiness Machines Corp.'0 7
IBM consented to a cease and desist order without admitting or
denying the findings of the SEC, and agreed to pay a $300,000 civil
penalty following illegal payments by its wholly-owned subsidiary in
Argentina in 1994.18 "Argentine tax authorities conducted a routine audit
of a local company and discovered that millions of dollars reported as paid
to the company were, in fact, either deposited in a Swiss bank account or
were missing. The U.S. criminal investigation proceeded on the theory that
IBM used1° the local shell company to pay bribes to government
officials.""
In this and in one case in which Argentine officials aided the United
States in a sting operation to simulate a solicitation of a bribe,"0 officials
from Argentina appear to have been unusually cooperative with U.S. antibribery investigations. Representing less than a half of one percent of total
U.S. foreign direct investment, Argentina has nonetheless helped in nearly
5% of all FCPA convictions or consent decrees-punching far above its
relative weight. That leads to a plausible suspicion that reluctance to
cooperate, or inferior policing skills, on the part of other countries might
explain their under-representation in successful FCPA actions, as the
corrupt activity goes on unabated.
10. United States v. Robert RichardKing'
This case involved payoffs to officials in Costa Rica for a major coastal
construction project. It represents one of the richest lodes imaginable for
a corruption prosecution: long detailed discussions in writing about the
subjects and methodologies of the payoffs. In one written solicitation to an
Indiana investor for a loan of $20 million, $1 million was allocated for
"reserve for kiss," one of the several euphemisms for a bribe. King's
conviction was upheld on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. 112

107. [2001] 4 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 699.8136, 1:00CV03040 (JR) (D.D.C.), reported in
SEC litigation release No. 16839, Dec. 21, 2000.
108. Id.
109. See Corr & Lawler, supra note 26, at 1290.
110. United States v. Herbert Tannenbaum, [1999] 4 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 699.583,
Criminal Complaint No. 97-4441 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1998).
111. [2003] 5 FCPARep. (Bus. Laws) 699.819601,No. 01-00190-01/02-CR-W-1 (W.D.Mo.
June 27, 2001).
112. 351 F.3d 859, 868 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 4213 (U.S., June 14,

2004).
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11. SEC v. ChiquitaBrands International,Inc.113
Discovered by internal auditors at Chiquita, the company eventually
consented to pay a $100,000 penalty, but neither admitted nor denied the
making of illegal payments to Colombian officials totaling the equivalent
of $30,000.
According to the SEC, internal documents at Chiquita indicated that the
bribes were to ensure that the company did not lose a coveted customs
license, which would have incurred a cost of $1 million. In the end,
payment of a $100,000 fine should have been worth the effort, as the only
individuals who suffered were the local Chiquita employees who were
fired. The disturbing message for other companies: as long as head office
is insulated on paper from bribes paid by a local subsidiary, the fallout
could prove to be worthwhile.' 14
Sengupta was a manager at the World Bank whose job was to select
and retain consultants for feasibility and other technical studies." 5
Sengupta was paid off by a Swedish consultant he hired, and then agreed
to a request by a foreign official in Kenya to have the consultant pay that
Kenyan official. He pled guilty to one count of wire fraud; one count of
conspiracy to commit wire fraud; and one count of violating the FCPA.
As if tying up a nice neat package with a bow for investigators,
Sengupta, according to the government, did the following: "In or about
December 1998, the defendant sent an electronic mail message from the
World Bank, in the District of Columbia, to the Swedish Consultant in
Stockholm, Sweden. The message was in the form of a spreadsheet
6
detailing the kickbacks paid and amounts still due and owing. "

113. [2002] 5 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 699.8296. 1:01CV02079 (D.D.C. Oct. 3,2001).
114. Worth noting is the FCPA's relative leniency as to books and record-keeping regarding
subsidiaries which are less than 50%-owned by the U.S. parent, which requires that the U.S. issuer
proceed[s] in good faith to use its influence, to the extent reasonable under the
issuer's circumstances, to cause such domestic or foreign firm to devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls . . . An issuer which
demonstrates good faith efforts to use such influence shall be conclusively

presumed to have complied with the requirements of paiagraph (2).
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6) (1994).
115. United States v. Gautam Sengupta, [2002] 5 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 699.8341, Case
No.1:02CR00040 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2002).
116. Id.
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C. The Remaining HardCases or Clusters
These cases are presumed to have been costly and difficult to
prosecute, but that is often because there is no evidence that they were
anything other than difficult cases, or else little specific at all about how
they were prosecuted." 7 Even if it was complicated to catch some of those
convicted or fined, the tiny number of such cases over twenty-five-plus
years of the FCPA make it difficult to believe that they are typical, and not
merely drops of water in fast-flowing river of corruption.
What might give believers in the FCPA's effectiveness some grounds
for optimism, is that the United States initiated two cases in 2003-both
dealing with the oil industry in Central Asia-which have the potential to
breathe new life into the Act because of the complexity of unraveling the
money trails needed to bring charges."' If the government can win these
expensive and complex cases, it could lead to more deterrence of bribery
than winning many more convictions which were inexpensive to
investigate and prosecute.

IV. FOUR PATHS FORWARD FOR THE FCPA
A. The Most Obvious Solutions to Improving FCPA Enforcement
There can always be calls for more money and personnel to combat any
problem, and to the extent the United States is willing to do this, an
increase of the recent sort of difficult prosecutions undertaken could
result." 9 Still, the numbers remain too small for this to be embraced as the
only--or even the main-solution to the problem of FCPA underenforcement.
The situation at present is the reverse of the one which applies to the
domestic U.S. tax net, where a low enforcement rate for domestic tax
audits fails to discourage the payment of tax because there is still a

117. See, e.g., SEC V. Ashland Oil, [1986] 3 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 696.95, Civil Action
86-1904 (D.D.C. July 8, 1986); see also United States v. Lockheed Corp., [1995] 3 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws) 699.185, Criminal Action No. 1:94-CR-226-01 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 27, 1998).
118. United States v. James H. Giffen, 326 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), trial scheduled
for Jan. 9, 2006; and United States v. Hans Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); guilty
plea to the charge of conspiring to launder money, sentencing pending. The Bodmer case is
significant as it relates to catching corruption via the prosecution of money laundering. See infra
text accompanying note 134.
119. See supratext accompanying note 118.
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perception that compliance is widespread. 20 In the international bribery
sphere, U.S. companies have perceived that competitors overseas are not
withholding the payment of bribes. With low enforcement rates at home,
the economic (as distinct from the moral) incentive is not to act honorably,
but to offer a bribe with a reasonable certainty of non-apprehension. As
with the tax net, a small number of difficult convictions could suffice to
increase compliance.'
Tarullo argues that while the Justice Department has adequate
resources to investigate and prosecute allegations of bribery, it appears not
to have a system for analyzing available information sources for evidence
of possible overseas bribery.' This argument is problematic in that it
assumes such a system of analysis is either costless or low-cost when, in
fact, it is time-intensive and thus costly. A DOJ with sufficient resources
and the will to go after bribery should be able to mount more than two
prosecutions a year. Tarullo concedes a resource problem at the SEC for
pursuit of possible civil violations of the FCPA.'
B. PrivateRight ofAction
Courts have held that there is no private right of action under the
FCPA,124 while Pines has suggested such a right be allowed in order to
encourage more FCPA suits, taking as one source of inspiration the
antitrust laws of the United States. 2 The critical difference is that the
investigative tools needed to prove criminal or civil liability in
international bribery involve the cooperation of foreign governments and
the investigation of international flows of money, two tasks ill-suited to
26
the private sector, at least without government cooperation.
If secretive off-shore financial centers simply opened their corporate
records to any private lawyer who asked, they would quickly erode the
main competitive advantage to setting up there as opposed to low-cost

120. See supra text accompanying note 26.
121. See generallyDan M. Kahan, Signalingor Reciprocating?A Response to Eric Posner's
Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 367 (2002).
122. See Tarullo, supra note 3, at 707.
123. Id.
124. Lamb & Willis v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111

S. Ct. 961 (1991).
125. Daniel Pines,Amending the ForeignCorruptPracticesAct to Include a PrivateRightof
Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185 (1994).
126. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
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jurisdictions on-shore. 27 This Article argues that increasing civil penalties
and decreasing criminal sanctions would make little difference with regard
to the FCPA: The problem is not so much one of evidentiary standards, as
it is in an offense of accounting fraud, but one of gathering evidence that
is expensive to acquire. Restatements of annual reports or sudden filings
for bankruptcy are obvious on their face, and throw up the red flags for
audits of accounting practices. Bribe money flowing through offshore,
anonymous companies is more costly to discover before even civil action
can be contemplated.'
Because the investigative costs of overseas bribery can be so high, the
FCPA is better compared with campaigns to minimize the use of child
labor. As in bribery cases where information on company activities is more
difficult to obtain, even though in black letter terms, bribery is a crime,
whereas subcontracting to a company in China which fails to provide
adequate education for its minor employees is not.
C. Bribery as PredicateOffense
Two private rights of action are in fact possible in relation to FCPA
violations: conduct that violates the FCPA is also a violation of the Travel
Act, 29 which is a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
predicate act. Private parties can sue under civil RICO for treble damages
based on allegations of FCPA violations.3 ' In addition, a violation of the
FCPA is a predicate offense under the money laundering laws. 3 ' The neartotal absence of successful private suits under these laws helps make this
Article's point:' 32 information gathering for such crimes is expensive. It is
cheaper to match competitors bribe for bribe than to slog through years of
paper trails to bring them to court.
Still, from a pure efficiency standpoint, the United States may find that
rather than spending money on detecting "original" crimes like drug
trafficking or bribery, it would be more efficient to combat laundering of
monetary proceeds from these crimes. 3 3 The OECD suggests reducing the
127. Transparency International, FAQs for Journalists - Facts and Figures on Corruption,
Question 8, at http://wwl.transparency.org/faqs/mediak.q.html.
128. Philip Segal, OffshoreBanks, Trusts Crimp U.S. TerrorFundInvestigation,ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Sept. 25, 2001, at 3.

129. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (bX3) (2002).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c) (1995).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (cX7)(D) (2002).
132. A rare example is United States v. Herbert Steindler, (1994] 3 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws)
699.131, Cr. No. 194-29 (S.D. Ohio, 1994).
133. See supra text accompanying note 118. Bodmer proved problematic only because it
straddled older and newer versions of the FCPA. One count of conspiring to violate the FCPA was
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level of culpability, perhaps even to criminal negligence, required to
prosecute the failure of financial institutions to report suspicious
transactions. 3 4 One benefit to attacking bribery through anti-money
laundering laws is that the latter are not evaluated as crudely as is the
FCPA. Rather than a simple list of convictions, reports on the
effectiveness of money laundering at least provide a rough estimate of the
scale of the problem.'35 Against that, success is easier to measure. In the
event of failure, new approaches can be proposed, whereas with a
probably-failed FCPA, new approaches can be batted down with factless
assertions that the FCPA works.
A more radical approach, though one which ought not to offend the
principles of legality because it would be a bright line rule introduced well
in advance, would be for the United States to limit the use by U.S. persons
and corporations, of offshore financial centers and anonymous corporate
entities. That would seem to demand a degree of political determination
lacking at present.'36
The United States has the power to forbid Americans from dealing with
foreign trustees, but that is not, apparently, currently being contemplated.
Had it been shown that Al-Qaeda had financed its pre- Sept. 11 terrorist
activities through the British Virgin Islands or Delaware, the political
landscape on the question of trusts might have changed. Instead, the
honor-based Hawala finance system, settled by diamond smuggling
between the Middle East and India, was found to be a principal
international financial tool used by these terrorist networks.'37

dismissed based on the rule of lenity. Still, the case stands for the proposition that failure to prove
FCPA violations is not a bar to proving money laundering in furtherance of FCPA violations, given
that bribers often employ agents to do their laundering for them.
134. See OECD, supra note 2, at 22.
135. Somewhere between 2% and 5% of global Gross Domestic Product. Estimates available
at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf, web site for the Financial Action Task Force, the anti-money
laundering arm of the OECD.
136. Such a move would depart from past practices, and is fraught with political difficulty not
only in the United States but overseas as well: "Federal legislation on the substantive law of trusts
would not reach many offshore trusts, simply because the United States as an entity lacks power
to compel the foreign trustee to act in accordance with American law." Stewart Sterk, Asset
Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom? 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1035, 1115 (2000).
137. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, How Bin Laden Funds His Network, TIME, Oct. 1, 2001; CNN
interview with William Wechsler, Director for Transnational Threats on the U.S. National Security
Council during the Clinton administration (Sept. 27, 2001).
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D. Shaming and Other NoncriminalMonitoringApproaches
Perhaps in recognition of the limits of prosecution-heavy anticorruption strategies, Kaufnann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, conclude that the
"next stage" of corporate governance reform include an increasing focus
on prevention and deterrence, working more closely with the "heretofore
neglected private sector."' 38
Kahan and Posner have argued for the value of shaming corporate
wrongdoers,' 39 and part of that argument is found in this Article: the harm
to the reputations of manufacturers found to be using child labor is at least
as harmful to a company as a fine paid following the "discovery by
management" that locally-hired company officers engaged in bribery
thousands of miles away from corporate headquarters. Elevation of bribery
to the same level as unconscionable pollution, or the use of child or prison
labor, represents a low-cost way to enhance deterrence of the FCPA.1" It
is important to emphasize that the shaming would come before, or perhaps
in place of, any conviction.
Also relevant is Moohr's argument that private actors, such as
investors, can encourage law-abiding business conduct.'4 '
Effective gatekeepers provide a counterweight to the norms that
may develop in corporate subcultures and to the judgment biases
that lead to inaccurate assessments of the risks of criminal sanctions
...
Market monitors may also sound a timely warning that can
signal corporate actors that they are treading treacherously close to
the line, leading them to make the rational calculation in time to
avoid or abandon potentially harmful acts. At a minimum, early
warnings by outside gatekeepers signal that the company is the
subject of a scrutiny that has market implications."
When Nike expends great effort to improve the lot of its workers in
Indonesia or Vietnam, it does so not because of a pending indictment, but
because of pressure applied by nongovernment groups, be they labor

138. See supratext accompanying note 10.
139. Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals:A Proposalfor
Reform of the FederalSentencing Guidelines,42 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999).
140. That is from a government spending perspective, since monitoring is done by

nongovernmental organizations.
141. Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in
PreventingCorporateCrime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 969 (2003).
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unions, ethical investors, church-affiliated groups, or other interested
parties."
The attractiveness of the shaming approach is that it needs not be
mutually exclusive with the criminalization of foreign bribery. Neither
approach has been attempted as robustly it might have been, so there is no
concrete reason not to try both as long as under-enforcement continues.
Prior to shaming, bribers need to be identified. Some of the successful
prosecutions under the FCPA threw up a sufficient number of "red flags"
to have signaled behavior consistent with bribe-giving. The main problem
is that few were watching. If there is the same pressure to bear on
companies that bribe as there is on companies that employ children or
convicts, then one of many standard codes of conduct and red flag lists
would be easy to use in analyzing a publicly-listed company. 43
A regime of disclosure to independent monitors is not similar to an
internal compliance program shielded from independent scrutiny. This is
an approach some businesses may favor only for optics reasons (as do
some law firms, which profit from compliance code advisory services).
Monsanto underlines the need for codes of conduct to be monitored by
parties other than the government.'" If a company as large as Monsanto
can go five years illegally omitting to audits its Indonesian affiliates, there
must be a way to hold it to accountable instead of waiting for the company
to turn itself in. Could the laxness of the FCPA be the reason businesses
say they like it, and claim to fear its severe but seldom-imposed sanctions?
Khanna's work 45 supports the idea that simple disclosure of how overseas
agency and money flows operate is to be feared by companies more than
the FCPA's difficult-to-obtain proof of wrongdoing. His thesis suggests
that businesses prefer criminal to civil sanctions precisely because these
are difficult to enforce, while at the same time providing the appearance

142. Infra note 154.
143. See, e.g., Michael N. Davies, Application of Corporate Compliance Programs to Sales
Representatives, made at the 9th International Anti-Corruption conference in 1999, at http://www.
tnsparency.org/iacc/9th_iacc/paperslday3/ws5/d3ws5_mndavies.html. Simple steps like refusing
to pay agents in cash; refusing to pay agents out of country and refusing to pay into numbered bank
accounts---or to third parties-would go a long way toward encouraging more transparent dealing
with intermediaries. These steps are easier to monitor than promises not to bribe. See also
Mclnerney, supranote 24.
144. See supratext accompanying notes 56-60.
145. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis
(Sept. 2003).
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that businesses are subject to the strict monitoring of the Justice
Department.1'"
Pieth too has questioned the utility of relying on strict criminal
sanctions as opposed to using civil monetary penalties, especially where
the administration of the home state of the bribee is not in favor of an
investigation into dealings147that might show the government (or the leading
party) in a negative light.
Another example, from among the FCPA cases, in which disclosure
might have alerted corporate monitors: in SEC v. Katy Industries'48 the
company neither admitted nor denied that it entered into a contractual
agreement with the consultant of a corporation which had not yet been
organized. The consultant, a friend of an official in Indonesia, was the
recipient of a percentage commission after Katy obtained an oil and gas
contract. 49 Absent a hard and fast rule against paying a company that has
yet to exist, many of the model codes of conduct make a related, sensible
point: payments that are legal in the country where business is to be done
should be paid in that country, and never in cash. Legal transactions should
have nothing to hide. Had there been a verifiable corporate norm against
paying agents offshore, Katy might still have bribed, but doing so would
have been more risky.
Another transaction that might have caught the eyes of nongovernment
monitors, had it been required to be disclosed, was BellSouth's decision
to retain as a Venezuelan agent the wife of a key legislator with oversight
of telecommunications. 5 ' The company neither admitted nor denied SEC
allegations, and paid a $150,000 civil penalty. Would this level of fine be
high enough to deter similar subsequent behavior more effectively than a
shareholder campaign which might have cast the company in a morally
negative light? Perhaps not, in that lobbying is a common occurrence at
home in the United States, where with certain restrictions it is legal. But
one major difference is that in the U.S. contributions are disclosed, and

146. Khanna suggests that businesses which ought to be good at lobbying against harsh
criminal sanctions, but in fact are little harmed by them when they arrive amid a populist wave of
revulsion over corporate wrongdoing, as was the case with the FCPA in the 1970s and SarbanesOxley more recently. Id. at 115-17.
147. "Making the OECD Convention Work," 1999. Paper available via Transparency
International Website, www. transparency-usa.org.
148. [1982] 2 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 619 (1978).
149. Id.
150. [2002] 5 FCPA Rep. (Bus. Laws) 699.8332, SEC v. BellSouth Corporation, 1:02-CV0113 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 15,2002), Litigation Release No. 17310, and SEC Administrative Proceeding
File No. 3-10678, Jan. 15, 2002.
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abroad they are not. Any debate about their propriety should start with an
inquiry into who gets how much money in exchange for lobbying activity.
Shareholders or other monitors ought to be able to demand that agents
disclose their names, receive money in their home country by check or
wire transfer, and have
a track record to avoid hiring novice relatives or
5
friends of officials.' 1
The problem is not that there are no decent guidelines for monitoring;
it is that the perception among ethical investors and lawyers who speak
and write publicly about the FCPA is that the Act is already an effective
tool to discourage bribery. 2 There is a danger that the various laudable
movements toward openness on the bribe-giving side will be ineffective
as long as the presumption is that the authorities in the United States and
other OECD countries are effectively prosecuting it.'s3
Think of it this way: if there were a similarly unenforced law against
using low-wage labor without providing educational opportunities, and if
shareholders or ethical investment groups were not as concerned with this
issue as they are now, would Nike have taken measures to educate some
of its workers in South-East Asia?" 4
This is not to argue that the FCPA should be repealed, which would
send a message that the United States is not serious about combating
bribery. Salbu's argument that there are better ways than the status quo to
combat harmful overseas bribery does not logically imply repeal of the
FCPA in favor of "work in the global marketplace to persuade other
nations to adopt and vigorously enforce laws that criminalize bribery
within their own borders.""' Instead, because some of the largest bribetakers are the officials the United States would be lobbying under this
approach, the way forward should include the FCPA as now written, in
addition to other approaches. Salbu's arguments that the FCPA amounts

151. See Davies, supra note 143. See also, e.g., Publish What You Pay web site,

www.publishwhatyoupay.org; The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, http://www.
eitransparency.org. On the demand side, Chad will submit to a citizen's committee evidence of all

outlays in its $3.7 billion pipeline with Cameroon. Somini Sengupta, The Making of an African
Petrostate,N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 2004, at A3.
152. Supra note 26.
153. Granted, a reliance on shareholder monitoring excludes privately-held companies from
a shareholder monitoring system, another reason to apply a multidimensional approach and to reject
repeal of the FCPA. However, the FCPA itself could be tightened by including non-issuers of
securities in the accounting and auditing requirements of the Act. See OECD, supranote 2, at 15.
154. Philip Segal, Nike Hones Its Image on Rights in Asia, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 26,
1998, at 1.
155. See Salbu, supra note 3, at 286.
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to cultural imperialism ring hollow if he argues," 6 at the same time, for
vigorous lobbying of foreign governments to change their laws or enforce
them more effectively. Which is more open to charges of moral
imperialism and abuse of [super] power? Aid and debt relief for poor
countries, which punishes an entire citizenry, or the attempt to jail a single
citizen of an African country caught helping to bribe his government, in
contravention of his own government's law?'

V. CONCLUSION

More likely than not, the FCPA is under-enforced-to a bad effect if
we believe our stated public policy that overseas bribery is a bad thing.
The pretense that the Act is an effective deterrent prevents the United
States from thinking about supplementary ways to discourage bribery of
foreign officials and others overseas. This flawed approach has now been
adopted in cookie-cutter fashion for the rest of the developed world, via
the OECD's convention on foreign bribery. Unlike the largely uncritical
reception the FCPA has received (apart from businesses claiming it put
them at an unfair disadvantage to European competitors allowed to bribe),
the OECD convention has been held to be of only minimal success.'
While more money and personnel would help tackle the more
sophisticated forms of bribery and concealment that until now have almost
completely escaped notice, other forms of moral disapproval and
shareholder advocacy could prove to be as good at deterring overseas
bribery, and at much lower cost. Radical attempts to increase the cost of
concealing money laundering would also help. Because of the current high
discovery costs in proving overseas bribery, a private right of action or
greater emphasis on civil judicial action would produce fewer marginal
benefits than other forms of wholly domestic corporate wrongdoing.
More intelligent monitoring carries the inherent risk that rather than
discourage companies to bribe, which would be the desired result, it could
drive more companies to conceal their bribery more skillfully, raising the
investigative costs further. There is, at present, no way to determine how
many companies are using sophisticated methods to conceal their bribes,

156. Id. at 283.
157. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I (c), 78dd-2 (c), 78dd-3 (c) (1998).
158. See Tarullo, supranote 3. See also Peter Eigen, Fighting Corruption:Multinationals'
Bribery Goes Unpunished,INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 12,2002 (describing the OECD conventionas being "in crisis," with budget shortfalls and "lackluster enforcement" across the countries signed

up).
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and how many are operating marginally more skillfully than the often
unsophisticated level of conduct that has handed government prosecutors
a significant portion of their (small batch of) wins.
As sunlight is the best disinfectant for bribery, it also works well in
evaluating laws to combat bribery. If improved monitoring of corporate
bribery makes companies more careful to conceal wrongdoing, it would
likely reveal a more pressing need to increase efforts against money
laundering. That would not be a bad outcome at all, and would come at the
short-term cost of no more than the one or two bribery-related FCPA

convictions we now observe each year.
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Appendix 1
1999 Transparency International Bribe Payers Index (BPI) ranking 19
leading exporters.
Gallup International asked: respondents whether companies in the
country concerned were very likely, quite likely, or unlikely to pay bribes
to win or retain business.159 Top possible score is 10, indicating least likely
to pay bribes.

Rank
1
2
2
4
5
6
7
8
9
9
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Country
Sweden
Australia
Canada
Austria
Switzerland
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Belgium
Germany
United States
Singapore
Spain
France
Japan
Malaysia
Italy
Taiwan
South Korea
China

Score
8.3
8.1
8.1
7.8
7.7
7.4
7.2
6.8
6.2
6.2
5.7
5.3
5.2
5.1
3.9
3.7
3.5
3.4
3.1

159. Transparency International, TI Bribe Payers Index, availableat www.transparency.org/
policyresearch/surveys indices/bpi (reprinted parts of appendix with permission).
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Appendix 2
The "easy" or "cheap" FCPA cases:

160

SEC v. Page
Airways

Cr. No. 7900273
(D.D.C. 1978).

SEC v. Tesoro
Petroleum Corp.

No. 80-2961, (D.D.C.
Nov. 20, 1980).

Money sent to company
without anonymous
bene-ficiaries (easy to
trace).
Paid into consultant's
personal U.S. bank

[1982] 2 FCPA Rep.

account.
Request for bribery

(Bus. Laws) 645,
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 9,

assistance from U.S.
State Dept. officials.

U.S. v. Carver

1979).

United States v.
Kenny
International Corp.

[1982] 2 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws) 649,
(D.D.C. Aug. 2,

Bribery scheme to
influence an election
discovered by court in

1979).

the Cook Islands.

SEC v. Sam P.
Wallace; U.S. v.
Alfonso A.
Rodriguez.

[1982] 2 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws) 682,
(D.D.C. Aug. 13,
1981); [1984] 2
FCPA Rep. (Bus,
Laws) 690.06 (D.P.R.

Simple paper trail, lack
of anonymous
intermediaries.

Mar. 11, 1983).

U.S. v. Napco
Int'l. Inc.; U.S. v.
Liebo

[1989] 3 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws) 697.74,
Cr. No. 48965 (D.
Minn. Mar. 10,
1989); 923 F.2d 1308

Code name for agent
was agent's girlfriend;
U.S. bank accounts used
for bribe deposits.

(8th Cir. 1991).

U.S. v. Goodyear
Int'l. Corp.

[1992] 3 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws) 698.19,
(D.D.C. May 11,

Discovered internally.

1989).

160. In counting the cases, I have aggregated civil and criminal actions against the same
individual as a single case, and for the purposes of this table, not all cases associated with a single
bribe are listed.
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U.S. v. Young &
Rubicam, Inc.

U.S. v. Morton;
U.S. v. Eagle Bus
Mfg. Inc.

U.S. v. F.G.
Mason
Engineering, Inc.
U.S. v. Herbert B.
Steindler

ONDIRTY DWALNG: TIME FOR A FACT-BASED EVALUATION

[1990] 3 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws) Criminal
No. N-89-68(PCD)
(D. Conn. Feb. 9,
1990).
[1990] 3 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws) 698.62,
Criminal No. 3-90061-H. (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 14, 1990); Civil
Action No. B-91-171
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 28,
1991).
[1991] 3 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws) 698.70,
Case No. B-90-29JAC (D. Conn. June
25, 1990).
[1994] 3 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws) 699.131,
Cr. No. 194-29 (S.D.
Ohio, 1994).

Checks for bribes
mistakenly sent onshore
in U.S. to unindicted
employee of target firm.
Payments through
Canadian agent's
personal corp. Agent
made large withdrawals
and deposits in cash to
his personal on-shore
accounts.
Precise amount of bribe
demanded in writing,
sent via U.S. mail.

U.S. v. Vitusa

[1994] 3 FCPA Rep.

Whistleblower revealed
the bribery. Earlier
related settlement by
General Electric
counted as same case.
Disregarded U.S. State

Corp.; U.S. v.

(Bus. Laws) 699.155,

Dept. advice not to pay

Herzberg

Criminal No. 93-253
(D.N.J. Apr. 13,
1994); Criminal No.
93-254 (D.N.J.
1994).
[1997] 4 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws) 699.462,
1:97CV00401
(D.D.C. Feb. 27,
1997).

bribe.

SEC v. Triton
Energy Corp.
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U.S. v. David H.
Mead

[1998] 4 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws) 699.534,
Cr. Complaint No.

[Vol. 18

Discovered by EPA
investigating a separate
matter.

98-3025 (D.N.J. Jan.

29, 1998).
[1999] 4 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws) 699.587,
Case No. CR-3-98073 (S.D. Ohio Aug.
19, 1998).

Payments to Brazilian
military officer
stationed in made onshore. No different from
a domestic bribery case.

U.S. v Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc.

[2000] 4 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws) 699.749,
Civil Action No.
99CV-12566-NG (D.
Mass. Dec. 14, 1999).

Timing of trips followed
closely the award of
contracts. Quid pro quo
need not be so easy to
prove regarding travel.

SEC v.
International
Business
Machines Corp.

[2001] 4 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws)
699.8136,
1:00CV03040 (JR)
(D.D.C. Dec. 21,

Bribes at Argentina
subsidiary discovered
during local tax audit.

U.S. v. Control
Systems
Specialist, Inc.

2000).

U.S. v. Robert
Richard King

[2003] 4 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws)
699.819601, No. 0100190-01/02-CR-W1 (W.D. Mo. June 27,

Long written record
detailing proportion of
money raised destined
to pay bribes in Costa
Rica.

2001).

U.S. v. Joshua
Cantor

[2002] 4 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws)
699.821601, Case
No. 01 CR. 687 (S.D.

Discovered by company
auditors.

N.Y. July 18,2001).
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U.S. and SEC v.
KPMG-Siddharta
Siddhardta &
Harsono and
Sonny Harsono

[2002] 5 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws)
699.8273, H-01-3105
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 12,
2001).

Disclosed by company
management upon
internal discovery.

SEC v. Chiquita
Brands Int'l. Inc.

[2002] 5 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws)
699.8296,
1:01CV02079
(D.D.C. Oct. 3,
2001).

Discovered by internal
auditors.

U.S. v. Gautam
Sengupta

[2002] 5 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws)
699.8341, Case
No.1:02CR00040

Sent e-mail spreadsheet
of bribes paid and
owing.

(D.D.C. Jan. 30,
2002).

U.S. v. Syncor
Taiwan, Inc.

[2003] 5 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws)
699.8626, (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 2002).

In the matter of BJ
Services. Co.

[2004] 5 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws)
699.8956, SEC
Administrative
Proceeding File No.
3011427, Mar. 10,
2004.
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Discovered during preacquisition due
diligence. Fines paid to
DOJ and SEC worth
less than 1%of deal
value.
Discovered by the
company, no indication
of headquarter
involvement. Cease and
desist order only, no
monetary penalty.
1
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United States v.
ABB Vetco Gray,
Inc. and ABB
Vetco Gray UK
Ltd.

[2005] 5 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws)
699.9054,
Crim. No. H-04-CR279 (S.D. Tex. June
22,2004).

SEC v. Monsanto
Co.

[2005] 5 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws)
699.9167,
1:05CV00014
(D.D.C. Jan. 6,
2005); SEC
Litigation Release
No. 19023.
[2005] 5 FCPA Rep.
(Bus. Laws)
699.9197, C-05-0660
MEJ (N.D. Cal. Feb.
14,2005).

SEC v. GE
Invision
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[V/ol. 18

Discovered during due
diligence for a merger.
Spreadsheet of bribes emailed, employee
corporate credit card
used for bribery, and
bribe-paying employee
reimbursed through a
Texas bank account.
Uncovered by company
after years of failure to
audit Indonesian
affiliates.

Discovered during due
diligence prior to a
takeover.
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